

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OLC: 77-0717/a
14 April 1977

Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosed are those few answers to the questions you submitted to me by your letter of 28 February 1977, R6616, which require classification. They are classified Confidential.

Yours sincerely,

SIGNED

STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Enclosure

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D. 2. b. What should be the role of the intelligence agencies in net assessment?

ANSWER: The role of intelligence agencies should be to conduct:

- comprehensive net assessments on two or more foreign nations such as on the Arab-Israeli balance.
- Soviet-U.S. net assessments to estimate the capability of Soviet weapon systems, to determine Soviet technical requirements and to identify trends and estimate the implications of Soviet programs.

Intelligence agencies should continue to participate in a variety of U.S. -Soviet net assessments conducted by the DoD. Beyond that, I believe a national net assessment mechanism--perhaps at the NSC staff level--should be identified. The role of the Intelligence Community in this mechanism should be to provide the intelligence data and insights necessary for its operation.

Intelligence organizations should not make comprehensive net assessments of the U.S. -Soviet military balance; for example, the capabilities of the two sides to damage each other in a nuclear war now and in the period ten years hence. Such assessments are highly dependent on scenarios for war initiation, U.S. operational plans and tactics and the success of future U.S. programs, and would require expertise and operational data on U.S. forces which intelligence does not now have. Nor should intelligence conduct comprehensive U.S. -Soviet net assessments of the overall "correlation of forces," involving all military and non-military aspects of national power.

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